Environmental Policy and the Inward Investment Position of US "Dirty" Industries
Do high pollution abatement costs have a disadvantageous effect on foreign direct investment in countries with a strict environmental policy? While it would seem to make sense to believe that they do, hard evidence based on trade data is hard to find.
The following article tests the hypothesis for the USA and comes to some surprising conclusions.
I
t has become increasingly apparent that there is widespread political and public concern about environmental issues. The environmental effects of economic activity tend to be very diverse and vary between sectors and locations. Local policies aimed at specific sectors lead to pollution abatement and control expenditures (PAC) that can vary significantly between countries due to differences in natural endowments and assimilative capacities, types of pollution (from very toxic and carcinogenic pollution to levels of acceptable noise pollution or landscape distortion), the structure of industry and services, the evolution of political priorities and policy models, attitudes of consumers and pressure groups, possible policy implementation limitations, effective enforceability of regulation, applicability of environmental and economic instruments and so on.
Differences in environmental costs may influence the relative prices of natural assets. This has consequences for industries that are nature-intensive. We may assume that environmental control costs encourage reduced specialization in the production of pollution-intensive outputs in countries with stringent environmental regulations while countries with lax environmental regulation can build up a comparative advantage in these industries.
Since chemical industries, micro-electronics, pulp and paper, oil refining, iron and steel, and many other so-called "dirty" industries are responsible for a very important share of national value added and employ-9 University of Ghent, Belgium, The study on which this paper is based was funded by the OSTC (BeLgian Federal Office for Scientific, Technological and Current Affairs) Programme on Sustainable Development, The author wishes to thank Tom Verbeke (University of Ghent, NFWO) for his helpful remarks. ment, any new measure that increases environmental (and other) costs, faces strong opposition from groups advocating that the implementation of stiffer measures will reduce the competitiveness of the targeted industries, which could lead to the forced migration of these industries (industrial flight).
This competitiveness issue has been studied by many authors. Complex theoretical models suggest that competitiveness could be endangered as a result of many parameters, but surprisingly there has been very little empirical support, neither when changes in trade flows have been studied, nor in surveys on the migration (industrial flight hypothesis) or attraction (pollution haven hypothesis) of pollution-intensive industries.
In her often cited survey of the existing literature' Judith M. Dean concludes that the many empirical surveys on diverse competitiveness-related hypotheses show no evidence to support them. She adds as a partial explanation that there may be room for better estimates of actual environmental control costs incurred by firms, and for estimates by industry of actual losses in output due to these costs. REPORT estimate environmental costs of around 1% to 3% of GDP for industrial countries. These rather low figures are based on sectoral studies for chemicals, metals, paper etc. But when we consider the social and environmental cost of only the transport sector, the OECD gives an estimate of 5% of GDR 5 The inclusion of health aspects and costs would clearly result in higher figures. Patrick Low and Alexander Yeats 6 make use of an RCA (revealed comparative advantage) analysis that enables them to conclude that dirty industries account for a growing share of the exports of some developing countries together with an overall world-wide reduction of dirty exports. Of course, many other factors could be responsible for this shift over a period of 20 years. They also suggest that production and FDI-data would enable a better analysis. James A. Tobey' in his analysis of world trade makes use of the Walter and Ugelow index of the degree of stringency of environmental policy. This index ranges from tolerant (index value 1) to strict (index value 7). The environmental policy of only three countries (the USA, Sweden and Japan) is considered as strict. Finland, Norway and Singapore follow closely.
Including a dummy based on this index in his analysis of net exports of certain commodities yielded no significant results. Although Tobey concludes that the empirical effects of domestic policies are not significant, he remarks that trade surveys are in many cases biased by trade barriers that are difficult to deal with at the empirical level.
If we can assume that the USA has a very strict environmental policy and data on production and FDIflows offer an alternative for analysis that excludes problems with trade data (trade barriers, strongly differing "openess to trade"-ratio's etc.) a sectoral analysis of these FDI-flows could give us valuable insights into the possible consequences of strict environmental policies on industrial location patterns.
FDI and Dirty Industries
We wish to analyse to what extent recent FDIpatterns inside and outside the USA could be influenced by the strict environmental policy that is maintained. We do not wish to explain investment patterns by means of a multivariate analysis including variables like market size, factor prices, corporate taxes and tax holidays, government grants, rates of return on foreign investments, and transportation costs. For this kind of analysis, Tobey illustrates that differences in environmental regulation are not easily quantifiable.
The USA has been chosen because of data availability: FDI, production, gross fixed capital formation and R&D are provided on a sectoral base. Data sets were taken from Survey of Current Business, the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database (3 digit SITC) and the World Bank Discussion Papers 159 (International Trade and Environment).
Assumptions on Location Patterns
Following standard theory, environmental regulation will lead to pollution abatement expenditures that increase input and output price. In competitive markets, increasing production prices will lead to diminishing profits if international competitors do not have to internalize the cost-increasing externalities to the same extent.
Depending on profit margins and the possibilities of reducing pollution by new technologies and new product designs, when standards are increased some sectors or firms will face additional environmental costs which are too high. In very competitive global markets this can force them to relocate their production facilities to regions with fewer environmental constraints, due to different assimilative capabilities or the lack of enforceable environmental regulation.
Of course, this possible relocation will hardly ever take place immediately after the implementation of a new environmental measure. The firm can make some "easy" end-of-pipe abatement investments that in the end do not fulfil legal requirements. In other cases, standards included in the legislation could change after some years and pose a serious problem from that moment on.
We therefore assume that the impact of many new environmental measures during the 1980's becomes
